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This paper analyses the cost of trading French shares on two exchanges,
the Paris Bourse and London's SEAQ Internatíonal. Using a large data set
consístíng of all quotes, limit orders and transactions for a two month
period, it is shown that for small transactíons the Par1s Bourse has
lower implicit transaction costs, measured by the realised or quoted bid-
ask spread. The market in London, however, is much deeper and provídes
immediacy for much larger trades. Moreover, we flnd that the cost of
trading ls decreasing in trade size, rather than increasing over the
range of trade sizes that we examine. This suggests that order processing
costs are an Smpurtanl Jcl.erminanl of bid-ask spreads, slnce competing
market microstructure theories (adverse selection, inventory control)
predlct bid-ask spreads increasing in trade size.1
1. Introduction.
The growíng importance of London as an international stock market where
shares from other European countríes are traded, constitutes a ma~or
change in the structure of Europe's fínancial markets. In recent years,
London's SEAQ International has attracted consíderable trading volume
from the continental exchanges (see for example Worthington (1991)). This
increased competition from London has induced the domestic exchanges to
modernise and adapt their trading systems. An example is the move towards
fully automated tradíng systems in Spaín and Italy.
It seems natural to suppose that London has attracted large volume
because trading costs are lower, particularly for large trade sizes. In
this paper we use a large data set, a simultaneous record of all quotes,
limit orders and transactions in both London and París, to compare the
implicit cost of tradíng French shares on the Paris Bourse and on SEAQ
International. The bid-ask spread ís a major component of the total cost
of trading, and we wíll provide a number of ineasures of the spread on
both exchanges. We also briefly discuss published ínformation on expllcit
costs of tradíng (such as commissions) in order to gauge the total cost
of trading.
In the paper two different types of estimates of the bid-ask spread
are presented. Flrst, the average quoted spread ís estimated from the
Paris limit order book and market makers' quotes in London. Second, the
average realised spread is estimated from actual transactions prices.
Estimates of the quoted and realised spread are presented for different
tímes of day and for different transaction sizes. The dependence of the
spread on trade size ls also of theoretical interest, because ít can be
used to assess the validity of market micro-structure theories that
predíct that the bid-ask spread will be increasing in trade síze.
Both the quoted and the realised spread are not dírectly observable
in our data set. On the Paris Bourse part of limit order can be hidden
from the publlc information system, so that the limit order book seems
less deep than it actually is. Uncorrected estimates would therefore
overestimate the quoted spread in Paris. In London the problem is that
there is some misreporting of transaction times, which causes a timing
bias ín our realised spread estimate. In order to circumvent these
problems we also present model-based estimates of the average realised2
spread using transactíon prlces only. These estimators can be seen as
refinements of Roll's (1984) estímator.
The setup of the paper ís as follows. In sectíon 2 we briefly
discuss the major theories that explain the existence and the size of the
bid-ask spread. In section 3, we descrlbe the trading systems on the
Paris Bourse and on SEAQ International. In section 4 we describe our
data. The spread estimates are presented in sections S, 6 and 7. In
section 5 we compute the average quoted spread and in section 6 the
average realised spread, both in París and in London. In section 7 we
take a model-based approach to estimating the realised spread that uses
transactlons data only. Finally, we summarise the main conclusions in
section 8.
2. Theories of the bid-ask spread.
In the líterature on stock market micro-structure there are a number of
theories that explain the bid-ask spread. Most theories vlew the spread
as a compensation for the services of a market maker, who takes the other
side of all transactions. In the literature, e.g. Stoll (1989), three
cost components are distinguished: order processing cost (including
dealer oligopoly profit), ínventory control cost and adverse selection
cost. In this section, these three components wíll be díscussed im m~re
detail.
The order processing cost component reflects the cost of being in
the market and handling the transaction. To compensate for these costs,
the market maker levies a fee on all transactions by differentiating
between buy and sell prices. Much of the empirical literature, such as
Madhavan and Smidt (1987) and Glosten and Harris (1987), assumes that
this fee is a fixed amount per share. However, ít seems more natural to
suppose that order processing cost is largely fixed per transaction, so
that expressed as cost per share it should be declining in trade size.
A second type of cost for the market maker is the cost of inventory
management. For example, a purchase of shares will raise the market
maker's inventory above a desíred level. The market maker runs the risk
of price fluctuations on his inventory holdings and if he is rísk averse
he will demand a compensation for this risk. This intuition ís formalised3
in the model of Ho and Stoll (1981), who show that the inventory control
cost is an increasing function of trade síze and share price volatility.
The third type of cost for the market maker arlses ín the presence
of asymmetríc information between the market maker and his potential
counterpartíes in trading. This theory was first proposed by "Bagehot"
(1971) and formalised ín the models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and
Kyle (1985). A trader with superior prívate informatíon about the
underlying value of the shares will try to buy or sell a large number of
shares to reap the profits of this knowledge. The market maker, who is
obliged to trade at the quoted príces, incurs a loss on transactions with
better informed counterparties. To compensate for this loss he will
charge a fee on every transaction, so that expected losses on trades with
informed traders are compensated with expected profits on transactions
with uninformed "noise" traders. Because the informed parties would tend
to trade a large quantity ín order to maximise the profits from trading
on superior ínformation, the adverse selection effect is related to trade
size: large transactíons are more likely to be initiated by ínformed
traders than small transactions, as ín the model of Easley and O'Hara
(1987). Therefore, the asymmetric information cost is an increasing
function of trade size, and the market maker's quotes for large
transactions will be less favourable than the quotes for small sizes.
These theories have been developed for markets with competitive
deslgnated market makers. Nevertheless, the theories are frequently
applied to exchanges with different trading systems, such as the NYSE.
The trading system on the París Bourse also dlffers considerably because
there are no designated market makers. But we may regard the íssuers of
public limit orders as market makers because they provide líquldity to
the market. Just like market makers they run the risk that their limit
order wlll be executed against a market order placed by somebody with
superlor information. The inventory control theory is applicable to the
extent that we can regard those who place market orders as demanders of
immediacy, while those who place límit orders are making the market by
absorbing inventories in return for a price concession. In practice, the
distinction between the two groups is not sharp, as any trader can place
both types of orders.
Summarising, processing costs cause a decreasing, whereas both
asymmetric ínformation and inventory control cause an increasing spread
as a function of trade size. The aim of this paper is to compare the4
depth of the market in Paris and London and to estimate the form of the
dependence of the spread on trade size from quote and transactions data.
We shall not attempt to ídentify the relative lmportance of the three
cost components in this paper. This decomposition is the focus of a
companion paper (De Jong et al. (1993)), where we concentrate on the
dynamic effects of trades on quotes and transaction prices.
3. Description of the markets in French equities.
In this section we describe the trading systems on the ma~or exchanges
where French equities are traded: the Bourse ín Parls and SEAQ
Internatíonal in London. Because the trading systems are so different -
Paris is a continuous auction market whereas London is a dealership
market - we devote two separate sub-sections to thís descríption.
a. The trading system on the Paris Bourse.
The Paris Bourse uses a centralised electroníc system for displayíng and
processing orders, the Cotatíon Assistée en Continu (CAC) system. Thís
system, based on the Toronto Stock Exchange's CATS (Computer Assisted
Trading System), was first ímplemented in Paris in 1986. Since thPn,
trading in nearly all securities has been transferred from the floor of
the exchange onto the CAC system. All the most actively traded French
equitles are traded on a monthly settlement basis in round lots of S to
100 shares set by the Société des Bourses FranCaises (SBF) to reflect
their unit price. The SBF itself acts as a clearing house for buyers and
sellers, providing guarantees agaínst counterparty default.
Every morning at 10 a.m. the trading day opens with a batch auction
where all elígible orders are filled at a common market clearing pric~.
Nowadays the batch auction is relatívely unimportant, accounting for no
more than 10 to 15'I. of trading volume. Its role is to establish an
equílibriwe price before continuous trading starts. Continuous trading
takes place from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.
In the continuous trading session there are two types of orders
possible, limit orders and market orders. Limit orders specify the
quantity to be boupht or sold, a required prlce and a date for automatic
withdrawal if not executed by then, unless the límit order is good tillS
cancelled ("à révocation"). Limit orders cannot be íssued at arbitrary
prices because there is a minimum "tick" síze of FF 0.1 for stock príces
less than FF 500, and FF 1 for hlgher prices. More than one limit order
may be issued at the same price. To these orders, strict time priority
for execution applies.
Market orders only specify the quantity to be traded and are
executed ímmediately "au prix du marché", i.e. at the best price
available. If the total quantíty of the limit orders at this best price
do not suffice to fill the whole market order, the remaining part of the
market order is transformed into a limit order at the transaction price
(for a detailed description of this system see Biais et al. (1992)).
Hence, market orders do not automaticaliy walk up the limit order book,
and do not always provide immedíate executíon of the whole order2.
After the opening, traders linked up to the CAC system will see an
onscreen display of the "market by príce" as depícted in Figure 1.
place fIgure 1 about here.
For both the bid side and the ask side of the market, the five best limit
order príces are displayed together wíth the quantity of shares avaílable
at that price and the number of individual orders involved. The
difference between the best bid and ask price is known as the
"fourchette". Traders can scroll down to further pages of the screen to
view límít orders available beyond the five best prices. In addition,
some information concerning the recent history of tradíng is given: time,
price, quantity and buyer and seller identification codes for the five
last transactions, the cumulative quantity and value of all transactions
sínce the opening, and the price change from the prevíous day's close to
the latest transaction.
In practice, the underlying limit order book tends to be somewhat
deeper than suggesled by lhe vlsible dlsplay of límit orders. 1'hís ís
because traders who are afraid that they might move the market by
dísplayíng a very large order may choose to display only part of their
limit order onscreen. The remaíning part, known as the "quantité caché"
or undísclosed quantlty, remains invisible onscreen but may be called
2 A trader who wants to trade a certain quantity immediately can
circumvent thís mechanism by placíng a limit order at a very unfavourable
price. Thís limit order will then be executed against existing orders on
the other síde of the market that show a more favourable price.6
upon to fíll incoming orders as the visible límit orders become
exhausted. Strlct price priority applies also to the h}dden orders. Ráell
(1992) suggests that due to the quantité caché the visible depth of the
market ls about two thirds of the actual depth when hidden quantities are
included.
The member firms of the Bourse (the "Sociétés de Bourse") key orders
directly into the CAC system via a local terminal. All market
particípants can contribute to líquidity by putting limit orders on
display. In partícular, the Sociétés de Bourse may act in dual capacity:
as agency brokers, acting on behalf of clients, and as principals,
tradíng on own account. Theír capital adequacy is regulated and monítored
by the Baurse.
There is some scope for negotiated deals if the límit order book is
insufficiently deep. A financíal intermedlary can negotiate a deal
directly with a client at a price lying within the current fourchette,
provided that the deal is immediately reported to the CAC system as a
"cross order". For trades at prices outside the fourchette, the member
firm acting as a principal is obliged to fill all central market llmít
orders displaying a better price than the negotiated price within five
mínutes.
b. SEAQ International.
SEAQ International is the price collection and display system for foreign
equity securities operated by London's Stock Exchange. For each foreign
equity included in SEAQ International, the system provides an electronic
display of bid and ask prices quoted by the market makers registered for
that equity.
The French equities in our sample are designated as firm quote
securitíes, whích means that during the relevant mandatory quote period
(9:30 to 16:00 London time, i.e. 10:30 to 17:00 Paris time in our sample)
the registered market makers are obliged to display firm bid and ask
prices for no less than the "minimum marketable quantity", also referred
to as the Normal Market Size (NMS), a dealing size set by the exchange's
Council at about the median transaction síze. Market makers are obliged
to buy and sell up to that quantity at no worse than their quoted prices.
In addítion, when a market maker displays a larger quantity of shares
than the minimum marketable quantity, his prices must be firm for thatquantity. Outside the mandatory quote period, market makers may continue
to dlsplay prices and quantities under the same rules regarding fírmness
of príces.
SEAQ International market makers are not allowed to dlsplay prices
on competing display systems which are better than those displayed on
SEAQ Internatlonal. Market making in French shares is falrly competltive,
see Rdell (1992): during our sample period, most French equities were
covered by at least ten market makers, and usually many more.
4. Data description.
In this section we describe the data provided to us by the Paris and
London exchanges. Ne have quote and transaction data from both exchanges
for the same period in the summer of 1991.
a. The Paris Bourse.
The Paris data set is a transcription of all changes in the tradíng
screen information for all shares on the CAC system for 44 trading days
in the summer of 1991, starting May 25 and ending July 25. Lle have
available a complete record of the total limit order quantity at the five
best prices on both the bid side and the ask side of the market and all
transactions. This enables us to reconstruct at every point in time the
vísible limít order book for each security in the sample, up to the
cumulative volume of the observed best límit orders. However, we do not
observe the "quantíté caché", so the actual límít order book might be
deeper than the observed quantities suggest.
Concerning transactions, there is an indicator showing whether the
transactíon is a"cross" negotiated outsíde the CAC system. We also have
available broker identification codes of the buying and selling parties,
which allow us to identify series of small transactions that were
initiated by the same person as part of one large transaction. The
transaction price per share for such transactions is defíned as the
quantity weighted average of the price of the small transactions that
together make up the larger one.
In this paper xe shall concentrate on ten major French stocks,
lísted and described ín Table 1. Panel A shows the number of transactionss
and the average prire~ on thr. Paris Rourse 1n our sample. For most series
there are between live auJ Lcu thousand transactions ln the data set.
Statistics on transaction size and value in Parls are presented ín panel
B, which shows that (excluding cross transactíons) the medían transaction
value ls between FF 50,000 and FF 150,000 (t5,000-L15,000 at the tlme).
The dlstríbution of transaction size is very skewed: the mean ís about
twfce the medían, indicating that a few large transactions account for a
large share of total turnover. Panel C shows the statistics for the cross
transactíons that are negotiated off-exchange. The crosses are relatively
large: their median value is about 2 to 5 times as large as the median
value of regular transactions, and the mean value ís up to 10 times the
mean value of regular transactions. Although there are relatively few
crosses (between 2 and S ~ of the total number of transactions) they
account for a large share of total trading volume.
We now turn to the distribution of transactions by time of day.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of trades in ACCOR shares in Paris. In
this figure the trading day is split up ínto seven hours, ranging from
10:00am to 17:OOpm (the period of continuous trading) and the number of
transactions in each interval for all days in the sample is counted.
place figure 2 here
There ís a clear lunch break effect between lpm and 2pm. More
interestingly, most trading takes place in the hour after opening and the
hour before closíng. The graphs for the other series show very símilar
patterns. Hence, our ciata match ttie U-shaped trading pattern found by
McInish and Wood (1990) for the Toronto Stock Exchange, by Niemeyer and
Sandas (1992) for the Stockholm exchange and by Kleidon and Werner (1992)
for the SB.P 100 firms on the NYSE. In contrast, Schmidt and Iversen
(1991) found an inverted U-shaped trading pattern with the trading
sessions of the German MATIS.
b. SEAQ International.
The data from the London exchange cover May to luly 1991. Table 1, panel
D shows some statistics for the ten stocks under consideration. There are
fewer transactions in London than in Paris, but the medían size of the
transactions is much larger. The NMS is generally valued at about FF 19
million (t100,000), a rather large transactíon by Paris standards. The
average value of transactions in London is about 10 times the average
value of regular transactions in Paris, and still somewhat larger than
the mean value of crosses in Paris.
Percentiles of the distribution of trade size in London and París
are glven ln Table `l. T'he results indlcate that there are many very large
transactions ín London compared wíth Paris. For example, the 99th
percentíle Sn Paris ís ín the order of magnitude of one NMS, whereas the
90th percentile in London already is about 5 times HMS.
5. The quoted spread for French equities.
In this section we provide an analysis of the cost of ímmediacy on the
Paris Bourse and SEAQ International. The cost of an urgent transaction is
determined by the available orders in the límit order book ín Paris and
by the market maker quotes in London. An important determinant of the
cost of immedíacy therefore is the quoted spread. For Paris, the average
quoted spread is determined as the average difference between bid and ask
príces in the limit order book for a certain size. In London, the quoted
spread is the difference between the best bid and ask quotes of the
market makers. Although prices are negotiable in London, one cannot
always count on "within-the-touch" prices for an immediate transaction.
In order to compute the quoted spread in Parls it is necessary to
construct the limit order book. We observe all new límit orders, as well
as all transactions that fill limit orders and orders that are withdrawn,
so that we can recursively build up the order book over the day. There
are two problems in constructing the order book, however. First, there is
the unobserved "quantité caché", which makes the book deeper than
observed. Second, we observe only the limit orders at the five best
prices, so that we do not have prices for larger order sizes. In
constructíng the book we impute the fifth best límit order price for all
sizes beyond the range for which the bid and ask price are observed 3.
3 An alternative procedure is to exclude those observations for which we
do not observe the quoted bid and ask price up to the requíred size. That
procedure introduces a selection bias in the spread measure because the
five best limít orders add up to a large size only when the market is
deep. Hence, that procedure underestimates the spread. Comparison of this
alternatíve procedure with the procediure described in the main text
showed that the selection bias is more serious than the bias caused by10
Clearly thís biases the average quoted spread downwards. Cm the other
hand, ignoring the quantité caché biases the average upwards. The net
effect of these data imperfections on the estímates of the quoted spread
is indeterminate.
A first way to measure the average quoted spread is by a simple
calendar time average of the observed spreads between bid and ask prices:
(1) S~(z) - E (titl-ti)(Alti,z)-Blti,z))1 I E
(tíil-tí) i-1 ll 1 1-1
where ti is the calendar time index (in seconds) of the ith change ín the
limít order book, A[tí,z] denotes the marginal ask price at time ti for
an order of size z, Blti,z] denotes the corresponding bid price, and N is
the number of quote changes in the sample period. Thus, each quote is
weighted in proportion to the calendar time for which it appears on the
trading screens (that is, the time until the next quote change). This
measure computes the quoted price for the margínal unit only. The average
spread for a hypothetical transaction of size z is obtained by averaging
the marginal spread over all smaller sizes:
N z N
(2) S (z) - E (t. -t ) E z-1~AIt.,Y)-BIt.,Y)1 ~ F (t -t ) C t-1 1t1 i y-1 i 1 J t-i itl i
For London, the average quoted spread or "market touch" can be derived
directly from the market maker's quotes. The London quotes apply to all
sizes smaller than or equal to NMS.
Table 3, panel A shows the average quoted spread i n London and Paris
for sizes up to NMS. The averages are taken over the period of continuous
trading in Paris and the mandatory quote period in London. All quot.es
outside normal trading hours are ignored. There ís no point in going
beyond NMS because the data on the limit order book in Paris for larger
sizes are very sparse and therefore spread estimates for large sizes are
unreliable. Table 3, panel B reports the percentage of bid or ask quotes
for a particular size that were imputed. The table reveals that the
calendar time average of the spread, SC(z), in Parls is very small for
small sizes, between 0.15-0.4'I., and rises for larger sizes. For example,
imputing the fifth best price for unobserved limit orders. See also
Anderson and Tychon (1993) who report large selection biases for Belgian
stocks.11
at NMS the average quoted spread in Paris is between 0.4 and 1.2'I.. The
quoted spread in London (the "touch") is considerably bigger than the
quoted spread in Paris for all sizes below NMS. The quoted spread for NMS
ín París is only half of the quoted spread in London. RSell (1992), who
had avaílable a number of snapshots of the complete limít order book
(íncluding the quantíté caché) concludes that the Paris quotes are
narrower than the London quotes for order sizes of up to 2 times the NMS,
but that for larger sízes the limit order book runs out quickly.
Fígure 3 shows a breakup by time of day of the average quoted spread
for ACCOR shares. For Paris, the average fourchette (the difference
between best bid and ask prices at the smallest lot size) and the quoted
spread for 0.1, 0.5 and 1 times NMS are shown. For London, the average
"touch" is graphed. The graph shows hourly time íntervals, except for the
early morning hour which is split in two because the London mandatory
quote period starts only at 10.30 am Paris tíme.
place figure 3 about here.
It is clear that the Paris market is very tight, the fourchette is only
about 0.25'I. for the series plotted and doesn't change much over the day,
although it is slightly higher in the first half hour, which falls
outside the mandatory quote period in London. The quoted spread in London
is much larger than the fourchette and also larger than the average
quoted spread at NMS in Paris for all times of the day.
A obvious drawback of the above spread measure is that it is a
calendar tim~, aver~y,e, hc~nce perlods in whlch there ís hardly any tradíng
are given the same weight as periods of equal length in whích trading is
heavy. A second estimator conditions on the actually observed trade
pattern by taking a transaction time average of the difference between
bid and ask prices:
(3) ST(z) - 1 E E IA[ti,Y]-B[ti,Y1J
Iz
N 1-1 y-11
where tí denotes the calendar time index of transactíon í. There are no
large differences between the calendar time average, SC(z), and the
transaction time average, ST(z), reported in Table 4. For Paris, the
transaction time average quoted spread is slightly smaller than the
calendar time average at small sizes, and about the same at NMS. For12
London, the calendar tíme and transaction time average quoted spreads are
also very similar. The timinp, of transactions therefore does not seem to
be very sensitive to variations in the spread. This is also evident from
a comparison of Figures 2 and 3: trading volume does not seem to be
concentrated at times of day when the fourchette is partícularly narrow.
Tradíng volume is U-shaped over the day, while the fourchette does not
display an inverted U-shape4. Therefore, the transaction time average of
the quoted spread is rather similar to the calendar time average.
A further refinement of the quoted spread measure is obtained if we
condition not only on the pattern of trades over the day, but also on the
size of transactions. The results of Biais et al. (1992) suggest that
indeed large transactions tend to take place at times when it is
relatively cheap to trade large quantities. This is formalised in the
thírd estimator, which averages the quoted spread over times that
transactíons in a particular size class occurred:
N z l N
(4) SQ(z,z) - E I(z~zisz) ií(A(ti,Y]-B(ti,Y]J~zi I E I(z~zisz)
i-1 - y-11 1-1 -
where I(.) is an indicator function that takes the value one if the
trades size exceeds the lower bound z and is smaller than or equal to the
upper bound, z, and takes the value zero otherwíse. Table S reports the
quoted spread SQ in for several size classes. For Paris, the value of SQ
is usually slightly smaller than the value of ST, indicating that indeed
the size of transactions is related to the quoted spread. Like S~ and ST,
SQ ís increasing in trade size, nearly doublíng from the smallest to the
largest size class. For London, only the "touch" was averaged by
transaction síze class, and these show no clear pattern. In London,
therefore, trade size does not seems to depend on the "touch".
In summary, the results of this section show that the quoted spread
in Paris is much smaller than the quoted spread in London for small
transaction sizes below NMS. However, for larger transactions the quoted
spread in Paris rises quickly as the limit order book runs out. Some care
has to be taken wíth these results because the estimates of the quoted
spread in Paris igtiore the liidden quantities and are marred by the
problem that we only have data on the five best limit orders.
4 Schmidt and Iversen ( 1991 ) did find a clear U shaped spread pattern
that was just the opposite of the inverted U shaped trading pattern.13
Section 6. Realised spread.
In this section we compute spread estimates that are based on transaction
príces rather than on quoted prices and will therefore be referred to as
measures of the realised spread. The limit order and quote data are used
to construct a measure of the mid-price of the stock only. The estimator
of the realísed spread that we propose is twice the average absolute
difference betxeen the quoted mid-price and the transaction price:
N N
(51 SR(z,z) - 2 E I(z~zi~z)-~p[il-m[il~ I E I(z~zi5z)
- 1-1 - i-1 -
where as before I(.) is the indicator function, p[i] is the actual
transactíon price (average price paid per share) and m(i] is the mid-
price at the time of the ith transaction, defined as the average of the
best bid and ask quote (or best buy and sell limít orders) for the
smallest possíble order size.
For Paris, there are at least two important differences between the
realised spread measure and the quoted spread measures of the previous
section. The first is that the limit order book data are required only to
construct the mid-price. This means that the realised spread estimate in
Paris is not affected by tlie quantité caché and the availability of only
the five best limit order príces. The second important difference is that
the implícit assumption that the market is equally deep on both sides is
dropped. One would expect that large trades are more likely to take place
on the deeper side of the market. If so, the realised spread measure
should be lower than the quoted spread measure for larger trade sízes.
Figure 4 Sllustrates this poínt for the Paris situation, where the
transaction price is equal to the (average) bid or ask príce ín the límlt
order book. The figure shows that the quoted spread at a given size will
exceed the realised spread if the trade takes place on the deeper side of
the market.
place figure 4 about here
In London transactions are routinely priced within the touch, and
therefore the quoted spread will be an overestimate of the realised cost
of trading.14
The realised spread is the measure that is relevant for a patient
trader, who can wait for the best moment to trade, but ít is probably not
a good indicator of the cost of immediacy. First of all, an impatient
trader cannot choose the deeper side of the market. Moreover, in London
transaction prices for larger deals are generally negotiated within the
touch, and the same is true for Paris cross transactions. This means that
the realised spread, which measures the average cost of actual
transactions, understates the cost of a hypothetical urgent transaction,
xhere the trader cannot rely on negotiating within the quote prices.
The estimates SR of the average realised spread are reported in
Table 6. In calculating the estimates we excluded all transactions
outslde the continuous trading (Paris) or the mandatory quote period
(London) because outside normal trading hours the mid-quote is not a
reliable proxy for the market consensus valuation of the stock.
Table 6, panel A shows the average realised spread ín Paris. All
transactions within the continuous trading period were used, including
"crosses". The table clearly shows that the realísed spread Sn Paris does
not increase with trade size. In contrast, in the prevíous section we
have seen that the quoted spread increases with síze. The dependence of
the quoted and realised spread in Paris on trade size is illustrated in
Figure 4, where a quoted spread estimate (ST) and the realised spread
estímate (SR) for the ACCOR series are graphed.
Estimates of the average realised spread in London are reported in
panel B. The most striking result here is that the realised spread in
London seems to be declining in trade size. This effect was also observed
by Breedon (1992), Tonks and Snell (1992) and Ráell (1992). A comparison
of Table 4 and Table 6 shows that in London the average realised spread
for transactions smaller than NMS is generally larger than the quoted
sprcad. 'fhis secros lmpossíble: lhe rules of 5EAQ Internatlonal obllge
market makers to stand firm at the best quoted price for transactions
smaller than NMS. A likely explanatíon for this anomaly ís a timing bias.
Unlike ín Paris, the reported time of transactions in London can be
ínaccurate and the market maker quotes are not updated very frequently so
that they may well be stale. In the Appendix we show that this bíases our
realised spread measure upwards, because the market mid-prlce may have
moved between the actual transaction time and the reported tíme. In Table
6, panel C we report bias-adjusted realised spreads for London.15
The observation that realised spreads do not increase with trade
síze is important because it is not in line with the lnventory control
and adverse selection models of the spread discussed ín section 2, or
with the assumption that order processing cost is fíxed per share.
Constant processíng costs per transaction, and therefore declining per
share, could be an explanation for the empírical result that the cost per
share is smaller for large trade sizes. We return to this issue in
section 7 where we estimate a parametric model for the dependence of the
realised spread on trade síze.
Comparing the realised spread ín London with the realised spread in
París, ít appears that the London realised spread ís considerably hlgher
than the Paris one, so Paris seems to be cheaper. There are a number of
caveats. First, there are few transactions larger than NMS ín Paris
(indeed most of those are cross transactions) while in London roughly
half the transactions exceed NMS. Second, the full cost of trading also
includes taxes and other explicit transaction costs. We return to this
poínt in the concluding section.
7. Model-based estimates of the realised bid-ask spread
The spread measures of the previous section relied on data from the limít
order book or quotes to construct an estímate of the unobserved consensus
value of the stock. The estimators proposed in thís section do not
require such a proxy, and are therefore less sensitive to the problems
encountered in sectlon 6. In particular, timing bias is not a problem.
The príce paid for this improvement is the need to make some parametríc
assumptíons about the process that generates prices. We build some simple
models to estimate the realised spread and to estimate the dependence of
the spread on trade size.
The símplest model that we consider is based on the work of Stoll
(1989) and George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991). In their models it is
assumed that the transaction price, pt is equal to the (unobserved) mid-
príce prior to the trade, yt, plus or minus one-half times the total
spread, S. We allow for an error term, ut, in the price equation, that
picks up various effects on the transactions príce that are not captured
by the míd-price and the transactions type, such as price discreteness
and trade size. Thus, the price equation is16
(6) Pt - Yt t (5~2)Qt
; ut
where Qt indicates whether the transaction is initiated by the buyer (tl)
or the seller (-1). The variable Qt will henceforth be referred to as the
"sign" of the trade. The mid-price yt in this equation is not observed,
so we cannot estimate this model dírectly. In order to obtain an equation
ín observables only, we first difference (6) and make assumptíons on the
dynamics of the mid-price.
If there is asymmetric informatíon between market makers and other
traders, the market maker will revise his míd-príce after a trade has
occurred. Moreover, for inventory control reasons he will also change hís
quotes because the trade changes his inventory. Let (1-n) be the fraction
of the spread attributable to asymmetric information and inventory
control, and n tlie fraction attributable to processing cost, then the
revised mid-price immediately after the transaction is
(7) mt - Yt ' (1-n)(5~2)Qt
Finally, between two Lrades public information on the stock's value may
come ín so that the new mid-price prior to the subsequent trade is a
revision of mt
(8) yt - RO } mt-1 } et
where where S~ is the average and et is the unexpected mid-price return
resulting from public information between the two transactions. Under
these assumptíons the transaction price returns can be expressed as
(9) Apt - S~ t(S~2)Qt - n(SI2)Qt-1 f et t Aut
This is an equation in observables (~pt and Qt) and random error terms
only. It is a valid regression model under the addítional assumptíon that
Qt is exogenous, so that Qt and (et,ut) are uncorrelated at all lagss.
5 If the pricing error ut is due to rounding, Qt and ut might be
correlated. In that case, an instrumental variables technique could be
used to estímate (9). We ignore tliis point in the estimation.17
Under this assumption, n and S can be estimated consistently by least
squares, xhere the coefficient of Qt ís half the realised bid-ask spread.
If we furthermore assume that (et,ut) Ss a ~oint white noise
process, the regresslon has a first order moving average error structure.
Moreover, the innovations in the true price are probably heteroskedastic,
as suggested by the results of Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay (1992). One of
the reasons for the heteroskedasticíty is the difference in the calendar
time span between transactions. However, there may be other factors that
cause a time-varying conditional variance. Instead of specifying the form
of heteroskedasticity, xe estimate by OLS, which under the stated
assumptions gives consistent point estimates, and compute
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors
using the method proposed by Newey and West (1987).
In the literature several spread estímators have been developed for
cases where no data on sign or size of the transactions are available.
Roll (1984) proposes an estimator of the spread based on the first order
autocovariance of the returns,
~Ap-E(AptApt-1)' In the simple model (9),
Roll's estímator is consistent only under some very restrictive
assumptions: no serial correlation in expected returns; no error term ín
the price equation (vu-0); no serial correlation ín the transaction type
(E~QtQt-1) -
0); and no asymmetric information or inventory control
effects (n-1). Under these assumptions, the first order autocovaríance of
the returns ís equal to -(S~2)2, and Roll's estimator of the spread is
given by
(10) S - 2 ~ P
Roll's estimator is biased doxnxard if there is positive serial
correlation ín the lransaction sign Qt (i.e. if transactlons at the bid
tend to be followed by further transactíon at the bid and similarly for
the ask). Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988) adjust to Roll's estimator
for serial correlation in Qt, retaining the assumptions that there are no
pricing errors (PU-O), no serial correlation in mid-price returns and no
asymmetríc information or inventory control effects (tc-1). Choi et al.
(1988) assume also that Qt follows a first order Markov process. Under
these assumptions, the first order autocovarlance of the returns is
(11) ynp(1) - -(SI2)2(1-xQ)2ls
and from this expression lhe CSS estimator follows directly
(12) S - 2 -x~~(1-éQ)
xhere ~Q is the first order autocovariance of the transaction sígn. This
estimator takes the form of a simple correction by a factor 1~(1-~Q) of
Roll's estimator.
The details of the estimation procedures are as follows. In line
with the previous sections, we exclude all transactions outside the
mandatory quote period (London) and the period of continuous trading
(París). We include all other transactions, including the crosses ín
París. We take logarithms of the transaction prices and multiply those by
100 to obtain estimates of the percentage spread. The estimation equation
is thus specified in returns, but only within-day returns were used
because overnight returns are unlikely to follow the same process as
intra-day returns, see Hausman et al. (1992). The classífication of the
trade as buyer initiated or seller initiated is done by comparing the
transaction price with the mid-price. If the transaction price exceeds
the mid-price, the trade is classified as buyer inítiated (Qt-1), and if
the transaction price is lower than the mid-price the trade is classified
as seller inítiated (Qt--1). If the transaction price is exactly at the
mid-price, the trade is not classified and the value 0 is assigned to Qt.
This procedure is exact for the Paris transactions the were executed
through the CAC system, but for the crosses and the London data there
might be some íncorrect classifications due to reporting lags.
The model-based estimates of the realised spread in London and Paris
are given in Table 7. Like our previous results in sectíon 6, the model
based estimates suggest that the realised spread in London substantially
exceeds the realised spread in Paris. Comparing the average realised
spread SR in Table 5 with the regression-based estimated spread, the
latter is smaller for all stocks, suggesting that the average of best bid
and ask quotes is not a good approximation of the unobserved true mid-
príce. This discrepancy is particularly striking in the case of the
London data. There, because the market maker quotes are updated
relatively infrequently, our data on the quoted mid-price may be a
particularly inappropriate basis for computing realised spreads.19
In addition to the effect of the sign of the trade (buyer or seller
initiated) the size of the trade may also be an important determinant of
the price. The microstructure theories discussed in Section 1 predict
that due to asymmetric information and inventory control the spread will
be an increasing function of trade size. To estimate the effect of size
we extend model (6) in the spirit of Glosten and Harris (1987) and
Madhavan and Smidt (1992). The price equation is extended with a linear
term ín the size of the transaction. In section 5 we found some evidence
for a fíxed processing cost per transaction that would generate a
decreasing processing cost for large trade sizes. This effect ís captured
by adding the inverse of trade size to the price equation. Together, we
add two additional variables to (6) and obtain
(6' ) pt - Yt t (5~2)Qt ; azt } 2'ztl { ut
where zt is the signed trade size. First differencing (6') we obtain the
equivalent of regression equation (9) but now including current and
lagged trade size and the inverse of size as regressorsb:
(y') Apt - (ip i(SIL)(~t t ait . yzt] t laEged Lerms t et t tyut
In order to reduce the influence of very large transactions (outliers) on
the estimates, we "censor-" large trade sizes. For Paris, we pick the
threshold at 2 NMS, which is ahout the 99.5`I. quantile7. The estimates are
presented in Table 8, panel A. In London many more trades would be
censored at 2 NMS, between 10 and 25 percent. We present estimates with
the 2 NMS threshold in Table 8, panel B, and with a threshold of S NMS,
which corresponds to the 95~ quantile, in Table 8, panel C.
Estímates of the trade size augmented model are given in Table 8.
For Paris, the coefficients of the size and the inverted size are small
but significant for most cases. The Wald test of joint signifícance of
the size and ínverted size parameters is larger than its 5'I. critical
value (5.99) for all series except one. On the other hand, for London
]ess evidence for a Lr~rdc size effect on the realised spread is found.
f' We du nut lmpuse rcrarict.iuns un ihe coefficíents of' the lagged
regressors. We do nol want Lo run the risk of imposing invalid
restrictions and thus misspecifying the model. Not imposing such
restrictions does not affect the consistency of the estimators of the
parameters of interest (S, a and y).
7 Hausman et al. (1992) also censor trade size at the 99.5'I. quantile..~ n
The size effect is jointly significant only for BSN (BN) and Axa-Midi
(CS). Partly this may reflect the smaller sample size of the London
series.
Hasbrouck (1991) uses a more extensive model to assess the dynamic
effects of transactions. More specifically, in his model the price effect
of a transaction can last for more periods than the one period assumed
implicitly in equation (7). Our regression based spread estimator can be
extended easily to include more complex dynamics by adding lagged
regressors to the regression models (9) and (9'). The parameters of
interest are the coefficient of the current sign, trade size and inverted
size, whereas the coefficients of the lagged variables are merely
nuísance parameters. The parameter estimates using four (rather than one)
lags of trade sign stiow otily minor differences with the reported
estimates and the conclusions do not change.
8. Summary and conclusions.
In this paper we compare the cost of trading French shares in Paris and
in London. The estimates of the average quoted spread, which reflect the
cost of immediate trading, suggest that the Paris Bourse is cheaper than
London's SEAQ International for small transactions, roughly up to the
normal market size. For larger sizes, however, the Paris limit order book
often does not contain enough limít orders and the average quoted spread
rises steeply, hence the Paris market is not very deep, The London market
with its competing market makers provides more liquidity at larger trade
sizes. The quoted spread in London for small sizes is however relatively
large.
The estimates of the realised spread show a slightly different
picture. It appears that the few large transactions that are executed in
Paris (often "crosses") have a fairly low spread, lower than the spread
in London. Our regression-based estimates suggest that at trade sizes of
twice NMS the realised spread is still considerably lower than in London.
On the whole, we conclude ttiat if the trader is patíent and prepared to
wait for counterparties, transaction cost for large sizes can be fairly
low ín Paris compared with SEAQ-International.
The full cost of trading on either exchange includes taxes and other
levíes as well. Information on such explicit transaction costs are21
presented in Lnndon Slnck Exr.hin~e (1992a). The commíssíons and fees ín
Lundun ar r, un avcr agc U. I d"I. ul Lhe tt ansacllun value and ln Parls about
0.5'I. (these percentages are for a large transaction of 1 million ECU,
roughly FF 7 million). Thus explicit transaction costs are higher in
Paris for large transactions. One reason is that in London many large
deals are done on a"net" basis, i.e. commissions are Sncluded in the
prlce.
A theoretically interesting result is that the realised spread 1s
virtually flat in trade size. Flence, we do not confirm the predictions of
the pure Snventory control or adverse selection microstructure theory
(that the spread should be an increasing function of trade size) except
for the quoted spread (where the spread increases with trade size by
construction). Our estimates of a simple model for transaction prices
confirm this result and índicate mild support for the hypothesis that
part of the order processing cost is fixed per transactíon rather than
per share.zz
Appendix. Adjustment for bias due to misreported transaction times.
As explained in the main text, the SR(z) estimates of the average
realísed spread in London for transaction sízes smaller than NMS are
sometimes larger than the average quoted spread, SQ(z). This seems
impossible, because the true realised spread has to be smaller than the
quoted spread sínce market makers are obliged to provide the best quoted
príce for transactions smaller than NMS. This anomaly ís probably
explained by a timing bias due to misreported transactíon times ín
London. In this appendix we propose a model for the impact of timing bias
on estimates of the realised spread that can also be used to correct the
SR estimates for this bias.
Let S(z) be the average realísed spread (as a function of size) that
we would want to estimate. Suppose that the transaction is reported late,
say at time ttk. In general the midprice recorded at time ttk ís
different from the míd-price at time t, so that in fact we estimate
(A.1) SR(z) - E~S(z) t xt~
where xt denotes the change in the mid-price in the interval between the
time that the transaction actually took place and when it was reported.
Suppose that xt is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance Q2. Then
we can apply the expressíons in Amemiya (1985, p. 367), who shows that
for a normally distritiuted varíable y- N(p,~2), the conditional
expectation of y, given y~0 is
(A.2) E(yly~0) - p t v.
where ~ and ~ are the standard normal density and the cumulative standard
normal distribution, respectively. Using this result the expectation of
the absolute value in (A.1) can be wrítten as
(A.3) SR(z) - S(z)(2~(a)-1) t 2v~(a), a- S(z)w
Figure 5 shows that the realised spread measure SR(z) is always larger
than the S(z) that we want to estimate. The estimates reported in Table
66 wíll therefore in general overstate the true spread if P~O.23
We now turn to a method to correct for timing bias. Fundamental to
t.he correciion is the assumption lhat the variance of the timíng error,
a~2, is Sndependent of the transaction size. Moreover, it Ss known that
most small transactions are at the touch (London Stock Exchange (1992b)).
Thus, for small transactions the quoted spread and the true realísed
spread should be the same: S(z)-SQfz). In Table 5, panel B the average
quoted spread by size class can be found. The first step in the
correctíon procedure is to solve (A.3) for Q, given S(z)-SQ(z) in the
smallest síze class. The second step is to compute S(z) for all other
síze classes from (A.3), given the estimate of c obtained in the first
step and the estimated values of SR(z) from Table 6, panel B.
There ís one problem with the procedure outlined just before. If we
take the smallest size class to be the class from 0 to 0.1 NMS, we
estimate quite a large v. In fact, the estimated e is so large that (A.3)
sometimes does not have a solution. Therefore, we choose to base the
estimate of P on the average quoted spread for all transactions up to 1
NMS. Because quotes are firm u{i to 1 NMS, the quoted spread is an upper
bound for the realised spread for this size class. Therefore, the
estimated c from solving (A.3) gtven S(z)-SQ(0,1) gives a lower bound for
the true timing error. This estimate of v will therefore yield a
conservative correctíon of the realised spread for other size classes.References.
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Bank of England Quarterly Review, May, 246-249.Table 1 Descríptive statistics of transactions data
A. General
average minimum
Firm full name price lot size NMS
AC Accor 771 50 2000
AQ Elf-Aquitaine 358 100 5000
BN BSN 889 10 2500
CA Carrefour 1919 5 500
CS Axa-Midi 989 5 1000
EX Generale des Eaux 2518 10 500
OR 1'Oreal 584 10 2500
RI Pernod-Ricard 1162 25 1000
SE Schneider 685 25 2000
UAP Un. Ass. de Paris 538 25 2000
Notes: price is average transaction príce in FF;
lot size is minimum transaction size in Paris;
"NMS" ís Normal Market Size in London (both as a
number of shares).B. Paris transactions (excluding crosses)
size value N
median mean median mean
AC 150 258 114 197 5255
AQ 500 860 179 303 9855
BN 70 205 62 182 10728
CA 50 87 90 164 9943
CS 60 127 62 120 6482
EX 50 102 129 247 9585
OR 110 248 64 145 6813
RI 75 113 84 131 3626
SE 100 200 68 134 4329
UAP 250 422 134 222 5206
C. Paris transactions (crosses only)
size value N
median mean median mean
AC 500 3339 384 2531 148
AQ 500 4558 183 1607 598
BN 300 1170 266 1039 378
CA 200 670 366 1268 307
CS 100 2391 89 2266 221
EX ISO 867 366 2070 475
OR 200 1176 116 694 271
R 1 300 '71"7 32'I 838 123
SE 600 1314 388 876 183
UAP 100 1378 54 728 402
D. London transactíons
size value N
medían mean median mean
AC 1400 2653 1094 2049 393
AQ 4000 8330 1473 2966 1168
BN 1000 1671 862 1487 853
CA 500 1199 950 2293 771
CS 800 1947 758 1858 291
EX 450 1038 1106 2545 905
OR 1250 2878 732 1691 449
RI 525 1260 630 1479 210
SE 1625 2841 1100 1970 204
UAP 3000 4503 1532 2406 518
General notes to panels B, C and D:
Size is measured in number of shares;
Value is measured in units of FF 1000;
N is the number of transactions.Table 2 Percentiles of transaction size distribution
A. Paris excluding crosses
90 95 99 99.5 99.9
AC 0.25 0.45 1.00 1.0 1.3
AQ 0.38 0.48 1.00 1.0 3.2
BN 0.20 0.30 0.60 0.8 1.7
CA 0.30 0.40 1.00 1.5 3.0
CS 0.27 0.40 0.94 1.1 3.5
EX 0.40 0.60 1.16 2.0 3.7
OR 0.22 0.31 0.68 0.9 1.5
RI 0.23 0.33 0.85 1.0 1.5
SE 0.25 0.38 0.70 0.9 1.5
UAP 0.41 0.50 1.50 2.5 5.0
B. Paris crosses only
90 95 99 99.5 99.9
AC 1.5 2.5 3.7 12.4 12.9
AQ 2.4 5.7 20.0 20.0 20.0
BN 1.6 2.0 2.8 4.0 4.0
CA 2.2 4.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
CS 3.3 4.0 5.5 10.0 10.0
EX 4.0 6.0 20.0 24.4 91.1
OR 1.7 2.0 2.9 4.0 4.0
RI 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.6 3.6
SE 1.5 2.0 4.0 5.0 5.0
UAP 2.5 5.0 5.5 6.6 8.8
C. Paris all transactions
90 95 99 99.5 99.9
AC 0.25 0.50 1.0 1.4 2.5
AQ 0.40 0.60 2.0 3.0 16.2
BN 0.21 0.36 0.8 1.2 2.4
CA 0.40 0.60 1.6 2.1 5.0
CS 0.29 0.48 1.1 3.0 S.5
EX 0.46 0.80 2.0 4.0 12.0
OR 0.22 0.39 1.0 1.5 2.8
RI 0.25 0.43 1.2 1.8 3.0
SE 0.25 0.48 1.0 1.5 2.5
UAP 0.50 0.75 2.5 4.6 5.5D. London all transactions
90 95 99 99.5 99.9
AC 2.5 4.4 12.4 I5.0 20.0
AQ 3.0 4.6 15.7 22.0 50.0
BN 1.6 2.4 5.0 6.0 12.0
CA 5.0 8.0 30.0 40.0 51.0
CS 4.0 6.0 13.3 21.6 32.8
EX 4.2 7.5 18.0 26.7 72.8
OR 2.2 3.4 9.8 18.8 20.2
RI 3.3 5.1 8.8 8.8 9.1
SE 3.8 5.2 9.7 10.0 10.7
UAP 5.0 7.5 12.5 15.5 21.2Table 3 Calendar time average quoted spread (S~)
Paris London
minimum 0.1 0.5 1.0 0-1
AC 0.247 0.277 0.444 0.646 1.268
AQ 0.187 0.206 0.300 0.409 0.977
BN 0.176 0.218 0.359 0.519 0.852
CA 0.216 0.245 0.372 0.504 1.346
CS 0.363 0.427 0.655 0.898 2.309
EX 0.135 0.147 0.210 0.285 1.004
OR 0.308 0.383 0.672 0.980 1.646
RI 0.367 0.413 0.650 0.912 2.106
SE 0.370 0.452 0.838 1.200 2.061
UAP 0.422 0.467 0.685 0.972 1.712
Table 4 Transaction time average quoted spread (ST)
A. Average percentage quoted spread
Paris London
minimum 0.1 0.5 1.0 0-1
AC 0.228 0.258 0.427 0.629 1.315
AQ 0.174 0.197 0.305 0.426 0.954
BN 0.174 0.219 0.368 0.531 0.852
CA 0.195 0.223 0.349 0.478 1.228
CS 0.336 0.405 0.655 0.913 2.208
EX 0.130 0.143 0.211 0.290 1.006
OR 0.293 0.369 0.673 0.987 1.624
RI 0.339 0.394 0.649 0.921 2.159
SE 0.334 0.414 0.782 1.150 2.025
UAP 0.390 0.436 0.665 0.959 1.685
B. percentage missing quotes in Paris
minimum 0.1 0.5 1.0
AC 0 0 0 I8
AQ 0 0 2 45
BN 0 0 2 22
CA 0 0 4 33
CS 0 0 6 50
EX 0 0 1 13
OR 0 0 7 50
RI 0 0 5 56
SE 0 0 I1 66
UAP 0 0 0 17Table 5 Transaction tioe average of percentage
quoted apread by size clasa (SQ)
A. París
síze: s0.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1.0 ~1.0 all
AC 0.237 0.271 0.472 0.523 0.252
AQ 0.179 0.218 0.324 0.363 0.201
BN 0.182 0.228 0.422 0.555 0.197
CA 0.209 0.234 0.336 0.375 0.225
CS 0.356 0.434 0.697 0.720 0.389
EX 0.134 0.154 0.225 0.263 0.148
OR 0.309 0.396 0.706 0.782 0.342
RI 0.359 0.404 0.662 0.778 0.378
SE 0.356 0.449 0.831 0.993 0.386
UAP 0.421 0.465 0.716 0.925 0.453
Nwaber of transactions per size class
AC 3704 1506 121 41 5331
AQ 5961 3824 477 117 10262
BN 8138 2731 152 10 11021
CA 5810 3670 545 149 10025
CS 4303 2179 138 40 6620
EX 5039 4126 611 158 9776
OR 4742 2173 101 5 7016
RI 2577 1061 68 24 3706
SE 3331 1063 77 21 4471
UAP 2714 2529 212 70 5455
B. London
size: ~0.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-5.0 ~5.0 all
AC 1.325 1.346 1.336 1.241 1.301 1.345 1.315
AQ 0.995 0.953 0.961 0.960 0.897 0.972 0.954
BN 0.880 O.R57. O.RqS O.R30 0.8]'l 0.8q9 0.852
CA 1.260 1.245 1.276 1.219 1.160 1.183 1.228
CS 2.418 2.206 2.285 2.132 2.054 2.166 2.208
EX 0.957 0.974 1.061 1.008 0.996 1.075 1.006
OR 1.505 1.625 1.625 1.656 1.680 1.716 1.624
RI 2.208 2.130 2.253 2.201 2.095 1.909 2.159
SE 2.003 2.072 1.954 1.972 2.158 1.922 2.025
UAP 1.841 1.655 1.740 1.681 1.706 1.488 1.685
Number of transactions per size class
AC 48 136 73 83 35 18 393
AQ 118 329 274 254 147 46 1168
BN 174 373 165 87 46 8 853
CA 66 192 163 158 125 67 771
CS 30 84 66 47 45 19 291
EX 88 267 158 194 131 67 905
OR 49 177 94 80 37 12 449
RI 33 71 39 31 24 12 210
SE 21 66 54 23 28 12 204
UAP 18 106 107 89 155 43 518Table 6 Average percentage realiaed spread SR
A. Paris
size: s0.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1.0 ~1.0 all
AC 0.245 0.236 0.251 0.230 0.242
AQ 0.193 0.202 0.188 0.160 0.196
BN 0.187 0.188 0.201 0.181 0.187
CA 0.227 0.212 0.221 0.200 0.221
CS 0.372 0.378 0.429 0.327 0.375
EX 0.151 0.154 0.158 0.145 0.153
OR 0.325 0.315 0.305 0.171 0.322
RI 0.368 0.352 0.384 0.401 0.364
SE 0.362 0.359 0.311 0.178 0.361
UAP 0.458 0.416 0.434 0.381 0.438
Notes: Transactions only ín contínuous trading
period (10-17). Crosses included in average.
B. London
size: 50.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-5.0 ~5.0 all
AC 1.357 1.164 1.055 1.286 1.382 0.688 1.191
AQ 1.759 1.237 1.337 1.028 1.298 2.046 1.307
BN 1.495 0.993 1.072 1.296 1.364 5.273 1.202
CA 1.720 1.521 1.137 1.158 1.226 1.390 1.323
CS 3.032 1.856 1.330 1.177 1.668 1.987 1.728
EX 1.452 1.105 1.067 1.035 1.128 1.478 1.148
OR 2.098 1.166 1.456 1.422 1.870 1.739 1.447
RI 2.146 1.192 0.980 1.783 1.410 1.101 1.409
SE 1.374 1.695 1.579 1.744 1.025 1.008 1.503
UAP 1.664 1.242 1.150 1.429 1.371 1.295 1.313
Notes: Transactions only in mandatory quote period (9.30-16).
C. London, bias corrected
SQ SR Realised, bias corrected
NMS s1.0 s1.0 ~1.0 1.0-2.0 2.0-5.0 ~5.0 all
AC 1.339 1.169 1.169 1.286 1.382 0.688 1.191
AQ 0.963 1.360 0.963 1.028 0.835 1.947 0.855
BN 0.857 1.134 0.857 1.115 1.211 5.273 0.972
CA 1.260 1.404 1.260 0.889 1.001 1.241 1.147
CS 2.270 1.859 1.859 1.177 1.668 1.987 1.728
EX 0.998 1.153 0.998 0.816 0.962 1.414 0.991
OR 1.607 1.394 1.394 1.422 1.870 1.739 1.447
RI 2.182 1.354 1.354 1.783 1.410 1.101 1.409
SE 2.016 1.601 1.601 1.744 1.025 1.008 1.503
UAP 1.709 1.232 1.232 1.429 1.371 1.295 1.313
Note: Transactions only in mandatory quote períod (9.30-16)
Hias correctlan dcscrthed in Appendix.Table 7 Nodel Dased estimates of realised spread
model: Apt - s0 } á1Qt } S2Qt-1 } et
A. Paris
Roll CSS 2s1
AC 0.178 0.259 0.214
(47.855)
AQ 0.143 0.196 0.167
(65.196)
BN 0.147 0.182 0.169
(86.701)
CA 0.154 0.241 0.179
(56.733)
CS 0.274 0.359 0.330
(48.947)
EX 0.109 0.157 0.123
(58.959)
OR 0.246 0.328 0.285
(59.805)
RI 0.248 0.336 0.305
(35.139)
SE 0.253 0.371 0.316
(41.965)




AC 1.075 1.802 0.890
(10.214)
AQ 1.136 2.040 1.290
(13.740)
BN 0.679 1.354 0.781
(12.666)
CA 1.003 1.991 0.809
(11.010)
CS 2.152 3.997 1.131
(6.961)
EX 0.954 1.717 0.771
(12.077)
OR 0.849 1.401 0.992
(11.418)
RI 0.748 1.284 0.819
(6.765)
SE 2.071 4.186 1.901
(4.396)
UAP 0.902 1.444 0.842
(11.575)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
conslstent t-ratíos belov parameter estimates;
Further notes see Table 3.Table 8 Model based estimates of realised spread
model: ~pt - s0 t SQt t azt i 7lzt t lags t et
A. Paris (sfze censored at 2 NMS)
2S 2a 27 Wald N
AC 0.181 0.059 2.399 18.513 5342
(23.338) (2.870) (4.279)
AQ 0.145 0.014 3.979 52.172 10364
(36.234) (1.745) ( 6.944)
BN 0.158 0.038 0.184 21.349 11012
(58.359) (3.665) (4.020)
CA 0.172 0.012 0.107 8.364 10157
(44.577) (0.527) (2.878)
CS 0.302 0.073 0.298 11.630 6608
(30.14s) ( 1.985) (3.3851
EX 0.115 0.017 0.168 1s.473 9970
(41.387) (1.163) (3.931)
OR 0.257 0.047 0.854 37.772 6996
(42.213) (2.446) (6.137)
RI 0.283 0.008 0.965 4.947 3660
(20.015) (0.226) (2.077)
SE 0.313 -0.056 0.561 9.337 4426
(29.231) (-2.053) (1.270)
UAP 0.348 -0.000 3.764 77.760 SS15
(30.332) (-0.021) (7.981)
Notes: size censored at 2 NMS;
HAC t-ratios below parameter estimates;
Wald: x2(2) test of joint significance of a and 7;
N: number of observations.
Estimated percentage realised spread
size: 0.1 0.5 1.0 2.0
AC 0.199 0.213 0.241 0.299
AQ 0.155 0.154 0.160 0.173
BN 0.162 0.177 0.196 0.234
CA 0.173 0.178 0.184 0.196
CS 0.313 0.340 0.376 0.449
EX 0.117 0.123 0.132 0.148
OR 0.265 0.281 0.305 0.352
RI 0.293 0.289 0.292 0.299
SE 0.311 0.286 0.257 0.201
UAP 0.367 0.351 0.349 0.348Table 8 Model based estimates of realised spread
model: Apt - SO t SQt t azt t 7~zt t lages t et
R. London (slze censored at 2 NMS)
28 2a 2y Wald nobs
AC 1.021 -0.145 -8.390 4.130 298
(6.661) (-1.222) (-1.982)
AQ 1.380 -0.089 -0.687 1.306 1072
(11.041) (-1.115) (-0.117)
BN 0.618 0.170 14.232 32.066 765
(7.336) ( 1.304) (5.659)
CA 0.841 -0.169 2.283 4.036 676
(8.767) (-1.447) (1.351)
CS 0.831 0.249 6.980 23.104 208
(2.601) (1.065) (4.684)
EX 0.747 0.006 1.687 3.079 809
(9.606) (0.062) (1.742)
OR 0.683 0.204 74.628 7.230 355
(5.161) (1.802) (2.588)
RI 0.535 0.193 26.374 2.625 130
(2.321) (1.121) (1.572)
SE 2.088 -0.157 -10.197 2.238 125
(3.494) (-0.332) (-1.352)
UAP 0.782 0.042 0.947 0.905 426
(6.167) (0.502) (0.903)
Estimated percentage realised spread
size: 0.1 0.5 1.0 2.0
AC 0.964 0.940 0.871 0.728
AQ 1.369 1.335 1.291 1.202
BN 0.692 0.715 0.794 0.960
CA 0.832 0.758 0.672 0.503
CS 0.926 0.970 1.087 1.332
EX 0.753 0.751 0.754 0.760
OR 1.002 0.845 0.917 1.106
RI 0.818 0.684 0.755 0.935
SE 2.022 2.000 1.927 1.772
UAP 0.790 0.803 0.824 0.865Table 8 Model based estimatea of realised spread
model: Gpt - SO t SQt t azt t~IZt t lags i et
C. London (size censored at 5 NMS)
2ó 2a 2~ Wald nobs
AC 0.976 -0.066 -7.459 4.123 298
(8.018) (-1.311) (-1.817)
AQ 1.283 ~ 0.002 3.167 0.241 1072
(11.391) (0.048) (0.486)
BN 0.591 0.187 13.980 30.103 765
(6.777) ( 1.569) ( 5.450)
CA 0.819 -0.095 2.325 4.263 676
(9.655) (-1.501) (1.370)
CS 0.793 0.188 6.996 27.599 208
(3.184) (1.794) (5.240)
EX 0.737 0.037 1.724 3.261 809
(10.204) (0.572) (1.770)
OR 0.735 0.113 70.061 9.312 355
(7.021) (2.189) (2.677)
RI 0.680 0.036 21.844 1.943 130
(3.696) (0.408) (1.381)
SE 2.163 -0.166 -13.606 3.896 125
(4.362) (-1.081) (-1.971)
UAP 0.814 0.012 0.606 0.534 426
(8.692) (0.346) (0.719)
Estimated percentage realised spread
si2e: 0.1 0.5 1.0 2.0 S.0
AC 0.932 0.935 0.906 0.841 0.644
AQ 1.289 1.285 1.286 1.288 1.294
BN 0.666 0.696 0.783 0.967 1.525
CA 0.818 0.774 0.726 0.631 0.347
CS 0.882 0.901 0.988 1.173 1.734
EX 0.747 0.757 0.775 0.811 0.921
OR 1.026 0.848 0.876 0.975 1.306
RI 0.902 0.741 0.738 0.763 0.865
SE 2.079 2.067 1.991 1.829 1.334
UAP 0.819 0.821 0.827 0.839 0.876FIGURE 1
ACCOR 10:08:43 24- 5-1991
-----Bid----- -----Ask----- --Transactions---
1 200 763 770 800 3 400 765 10:08
1 500 762 774 100 1 50 765 10:08
1 400 761 775 200 1 50 770 10:06
4 450 760 778 5000 1 SO 770 10:02
1 50 754 779 100 1 100 768 10:02
Figure 1 Simplified trading screen of CAC system
Limlt orders: five best prices, total quantity at that
price and number of individual orders involved.




Figure 2 Trading volume by tíme of day in Paris, Accor.
Figure 2
10 it 12 13 14 15 16 17
Solid line: percentage of transactlons ín time ínterval.









Figure 3 Average quoted spread by time of day, Accor.
Top líne: average quoted spread (S~) in London for NMS.
Bottom lines: average quoted spread (S~) in Paris for smallest size,
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Figure 4 Quoted and realised epread in Paria by transaction eize, Accor.
Top line: transaction time average of quoted spread ST(z);
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Figure S Timing bias by etandard devíation of reprting error.
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